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EVIDENCE OF AMBIGUITY: THE EFFECT OF
CIRCUIT SPLITS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
I. INTRODUCTION

Federal criminal laws have rampantly escalated in number and
effect.'
They have increased overwhelmingly in recent years, some
becoming harsher, and some overlapping state laws that punish the same
acts. 2 States generally enact and enforce criminal laws-a tradition
entrenched in the United States Constitution and promoted by dual
sovereignty and Federalism.3 But now prosecutors find within the morass
of federal criminal law a bounty of offenses to charge and numerous ways
to increase the severity of those offenses. 4 As a result, defendants find little
I

See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The FederalInterest in CriminalLaw, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV.

1127, 1130-37 (1997) (critiquing expansive effects of federalizing criminal law). See generally
Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 704-11 (2005)
(criticizing expansion of federal criminal law and exemplifying its overcriminalization).
2 See United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 811 (6th Cir. 2001) (Merritt, J., dissenting)
(describing "increasingly harsh and rigid" federal criminal laws); United States v. Snyder, 136
F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 1998) (expressing "judicial dissatisfaction" with "continuing federalization
of criminal law"). The Snyder court lamented over disparities between federal and state
sentencing guidelines and the ability of prosecutors to "expose selected defendants to elevated
sentences." Id. at 70. The court further expressed its inability to depart from federal sentencing
guidelines despite its dissatisfaction. See id. Additionally, defendants can be charged with state
and federal crimes for the same act. See United States v. Angleton, 221 F. Supp. 2d 696, 708-09
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (explaining positive and negative results caused by overlapping federal criminal
prosecutions with state criminal prosecutions); David A. Fusco, The ConstitutionalIssue Hidden
Within a CircuitSplit: Double Jeopardy in the Context of Proving PredicateOffenses, 4 SETON
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 265, 283 (2008) (explaining defendants can be charged twice for same act
under dual sovereign doctrine).
3 See Luna, supra note 1, at 744 (criticizing "potential smothering effect[s] of national
legislation" on "libertarian-style federalism") (internal quotation omitted); see also Graves v.
New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 488 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (warning
federalism should not cause state and federal governments to "cripple . . . operations of the
other"); W.B. v. Latimer, 1 L. Ed. 915, *5 (Del. 1788) (recognizing "spirit of federalism"
governing apportionment of authority between states and Congress). From early on, the Court
sought to "prevent any conflict between the federal and state powers; to construe both so as to
avoid an interference ... and to preserve that harmony of action in both, on which the prosperity
and happiness of all depend." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 338 (1819).
4 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, ProsecutorialPower in an Adversarial System: Lessons From
Current White Collar Cases and the InquisitorialModel, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 181 (2004)
(noticing broad prosecutorial power resulting from numerous vague statutes); see also Conrad
Hester, Note, Reviving Lenity: Prosecutorial Use of the Rule of Lenity as an Alternative to
Limitations on Judicial Use, 27 REV. LITIG. 513, 513-14 (2008) (discussing power of federal
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5
mercy from the federal criminal justice system.

The federal criminal justice system affords defendants some
measure of relief when courts construe ambiguous statutes in favor of the
defendant. 6 Courts apply principles of statutory construction to interpret
federal criminal laws. 7 If a statute remains ambiguous after a court applies
the traditional methods of statutory construction, the court should apply the
rule of lenity, a doctrine that requires courts to resolve ambiguities in
criminal statutes in the defendant's favor.8 But federal courts of appeals
sometimes interpret the same federal criminal statute differently, thus
creating a judicial irony dubbed the "circuit split." 9 Circuit splits indicate
that the law in question not only had the ability to be interpreted multiple
ways, but that it was actually interpreted multiple ways.' ° Do these

prosecutors). The "most powerful person in America is the prosecutor," whose power is "prone
to abuse" because "[t]he prosecutor's discretion in interpreting ambiguous statutes" lacks
incentive for constraint. See Hester, supra, at 513-14.
5 See United States v. Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 305-06 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying
unconstitutionality of federal mandatory minimum). The Palmer court upheld a federal sentence
of ten years imprisonment where the defendant's accomplice received a sentence under state law
consisting of a mere $176 fine. Id. at 306, 306 n.3; Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalizationof Criminal Law, 70 S.CAL. L. REv. 643, 647-48 (1997) (denouncing excessive
federalizing of criminal law as too harsh on defendants). Defendants "often fare worse [when]
prosecuted in federal court rather than state court." Clymer, supra, at 647. For example,
defendants prosecuted in federal courts more often "receive a longer sentence and ... serve far
more of that sentence than [the defendant] would if sentenced in state court." Id. at 648.
6 See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 515 (2008) (plurality opinion) (describing rule
of lenity as interpreting ambiguous laws to favor defendants); see also Randall S. Abate and
Dayna E.Mancuso, Article, It's All About What You Know: The Specific Intent StandardShould
Govern "Knowing" Violations of the Clean Water Act, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 304, 335 (2001)
("[T]he rule of lenity promotes fairness in that it helps avoid overcriminalizing allegedly criminal
conduct ....).
7 See United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 262-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (laying roadmap of
statutory construction). Courts apply the following principles of statutory construction to
interpret an ambiguous statute: examining its plain language, its legislative history, and relevant
case law. Id. at 264.
8 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1990) (advising for application of
lenity only after use of other canons of statutory construction). The principles of statutory
construction end by applying lenity as a last resort if the statute remains ambiguous. Dauray,215
F.3d at 262-64. The Dauray court first looked to the statute's language, determining the meaning
of the words as they related to each other. Id. at 262. The court then looked to the overall
statutory structure, attempting to discern the provision's meaning in light of the entire statute. Id.
at 262-63. The court could not reach a result that was not absurd based on the statute's language
and looked to the legislative history to discern the statute's meaning and applicability. Id. at 26364. The court finally found the statute too ambiguous to determine the legislative intent and
refused to apply the statute against the defendant. Id. at 264-65.
9 See United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174, 179-80 (5th Cir. 2008) (evidencing circuit
split in single drug trafficking law).
10 See id. (explaining varying interpretations by different circuits of same law); see also infra
note 37 (laying out specified circuit split).
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alternative interpretations present primafacie evidence of ambiguity?"
This Note advocates closer review of federal criminal statutes
where a circuit split exists regarding their interpretation. 12 A circuit split
should evidence the statute's ambiguity, be considered by the deciding
federal circuit before construing the statute against the defendant, and thus
support an interpretation favoring the defendant.' 3 Part II assesses this
Note's premise: the negative consequences of the current state of
overcriminalization of federal law and various circuit splits within federal
criminal law. 14 Part III provides the history of resolving statutory
ambiguity in the defendant's favor through various modes of statutory
construction and examines the ways federal circuits treat circuit splits when
interpreting federal criminal laws. " Part IV first argues a necessary
remedy for overcriminalization of federal law: A court should favor the
defendant when a criminal statute is ambiguous. 16 Part IV then analyzes
how federal circuits appropriately look to other circuits to aid in statutory
interpretation. 17 Finally, Part IV advocates that a circuit split presents
evidence of ambiguity and should thus help define a court's interpretation
of a criminal statute.' 8 Part V concludes that the deciding court should
construe such a statute in favor of the defendant. 19
II. THE OVERCRIMINALIZATION OF FEDERAL LAW AND
CIRCUIT SPLITS WITHIN
Federal criminal laws have ballooned recently.20 This is largely
due to increased legislative interest in policies propagated by proponents on
both sides of the political aisle. 2 Regardless of cause, the effect remains:
Enforcing "repetitive and overlapping statutes" treads on states' rights and
11 See infra Part
See
13 See
14 See
15 See
16 See
17 See
18 See
19 See
20 See
12

IV.C (arguing affirmative answer to question presented).
infra Part IV.
infra Part IV.
infra Part II.
infra Part III.
infra Part IVA.
infra Part IV.B.
infra Part IV.C.
infra Part V.
Moohr, supra note 1, at 1130-37 (expressing negative effects of federalization of

criminal law). See generally Luna, supra note 1, at 704-11 (detailing examples of expanded
federal criminal law).
21 See Moohr, supra note 1, at 1130 (postulating increased legislative interest in
federalization of criminal law). Liberals generally support a strong federal government and
criticize states' rights as a throwback to anti-civil rights rhetoric while conservatives promote
ideals of law and order despite their frequent states' rights position. Id.
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on a defendant's individual freedoms.2 2 The ballooned federal criminal law
threatens to float beyond reach without hope of coming back to earth.23
Manufacturing a glut of federal laws inevitably allows more federal
prosecutions.24 This glut bolsters the prosecutor's power, especially when
statutes are vague, thereby providing great latitude to define criminal
behavior. 25 A want of specificity further allows prosecutors to charge a
federal crime for an act that also violates state law. 26 This dual-charge
ability generates harm where federal criminal laws "smother[]" state and
local criminal laws, thus "preempt[ing] local solutions to local .
problems. 27 Additionally, and more dangerously, federal criminal laws
duplicate state and local criminal laws and overlap existing federal criminal
laws, providing an overabundance of crimes to charge against a defendant's
single act. 28 Indeed, preempting state and local laws endangers the checks
and balances against unfairness to the defendant inherent within American
federalism.29
The unfairness of overcriminalization exists plainly in the dual
sovereign doctrine whereby a state court can convict a defendant of a state
crime and a federal court can convict that same defendant for a federal

22

See Clymer, supra note 5, at 647 (detailing overlap of federal criminal law onto state

criminal law); Luna, supra note 1, at 708 (decrying congressional expansion of criminal liability
when it overlaps state laws and creates superfluous laws); Moohr, supra note 1, at 1137 (noting
possibility state and federal courts will be "engaged in essentially identical work").
23 See Moohr, supra note 1, at 1136-37 (noting long-term plans for dealing with increased
case-load from federalization of criminal law).

24 See Ellen S. Podgor, Jose Padilla and 3/Iartha Stewart: Who Should Be Charged With
Criminal Conduct?, 109 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1059, 1061 (2005) ("The increase in new legislation,

permitting increased federal prosecution, is not the only cause of overfederalization and
overcriminalization.").
25 See Moohr, supra note 4, at 181 ("[B]road, vague statutes enhance[] prosecutorial power
by implicitly authorizing prosecutors to classify certain conduct as criminal.").
26 See Podgor, supra note 24, at 1061-62 ("Generic statutes allow federal prosecutors
discretion to proceed criminally against conduct that might normally be considered state or local
criminal activity.").
27 See Luna, supra note 1, at 743-44 (describing overcriminalization's distortion of
federalism).
28 See Fusco, supra note 2, at 283 (noting federal prosecutors' ability to charge defendants
for crimes already charged in state courts); Moohr, supra note 4, at 181 (noting increase in
prosecutorial power resulting from increase in amount of laws). For example, carjacking overlaps
robbery and kidnapping, allowing a superfluity for federal prosecutors that, uncontained, could
drown defendants' rights. See Luna, supra note 1, at 708.
29 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1991) (reasoning federalism is meant to
protect individual liberties against government tyranny); Luna, supra note 1, at 744 (admonishing
federal police power as inhibiting state authority). State governments are closer to the people and
are the traditional holders of the police power, and thus a federal police power would "preempt
local solutions to local.., problems." See Luna, supra note 1, at 744.
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crime arising from commission of the same act.30 Astoundingly, this dualcharging does not violate constitutional protections guarding against double
jeopardy.3" The dual sovereign doctrine epitomizes a surreptitious inequity
of federalism; pitting the defendant against two governments in two trials
in two court systems for violation of two laws for one act.3 2 The
overextension of federal criminal law makes this inequity unbearable. 33
Numerous splits exist throughout the federal circuits regarding the
interpretation of federal criminal law. 4 Federal circuits split on the
interpretation of language in a felon-in-possession law: whether "in any
court" includes foreign courts.35 The circuits vary on interpreting the intent
requirement of the same felon-in-possession law, namely whether an
36
accomplice had to have "knowledge" that the possessor was a felon.
Federal circuits split on whether a drug trafficking law presumed intent to
See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (describing dual sovereign doctrine).
31 See id. (describing dual-charging as fair because defendant commits crime violating both
30

federal and state law); see also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1959) (upholding
Lanza by holding Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar federal prosecution after state prosecution);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1959) (upholding Lanza by holding Fourteenth
Amendment did not bar state prosecution after federal prosecution). The Bartkus Court refused to
apply the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state prosecution following a federal prosecution
for the same acts because it could obstruct a state's development of a 'just body of criminal law."
Id. The Double Jeopardy Clause, however, has since been applied to the states. See Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). Despite the Court's application of the Double Jeopardy
Clause to the states, "the circuit courts have continued to reaffirm and apply Bartkus ... [and]
Abbate ...to uphold successive prosecutions by state and federal governments.
...United
States v. Angleton, 221 F. Supp. 2d 696, 712 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing numerous circuit court
cases affirming dual sovereign doctrine application).
32 See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 150 (Black, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's dual
sovereign doctrine application). Justice Black considered liberty from double prosecutions
inherent within American jurisprudence, a fundamental right protected throughout human history.
Id. at 151-55. Federalism fails to protect individual liberties in these types of scenarios and may
suppress them. See id. (finding dual sovereign doctrine a dangerous affront to fundamental
rights); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987)
(noting federalism was made to "protect, not defeat, [the] legal substance of individual rights").
33 See Angleton, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 712 (noting increase in federal criminal laws heightens
tension with dual sovereign doctrine).
34 See cases cited infra notes 3 5-37 and accompanying text (surveying circuit splits in federal
criminal law).
35 See United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2003) (summarizing circuit split
regarding meaning of "in any court"). The Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits decided that "in any
court" includes foreign courts, while the Tenth Circuit determined that the language was too
ambiguous to rule against the defendant and decided that "in any court" did not include foreign
courts. Id. at 92. Importantly, the Tenth Circuit so ruled after applying lenity. Id.
36 See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App'x 135, 142 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting various
circuits' opinions on interpretation of intent requirement for finding accomplice liability). The
Seventh and Ninth Circuits determined that the government was not required to prove knowledge
of the accomplice that the possessor was a felon, but the Third and Sixth Circuits required the
government to prove the knowledge of the accomplice as an element of the offense. Id.
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distribute based solely on the quantity of the drug.3 7 These and other
circuit splits provide a backdrop for their effect on federal criminal law. 38
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS
While federal criminal laws multiply exponentially and prosecutors
exert vast powers, defendants find few reprieves.39 A court has the duty to
apply these laws to defendants in specific cases, but judicial construction
should not unduly broaden the scope of a law passed by Congress. 40 A
court must interpret the federal criminal law's meaning to apply it against a
defendant, but when a court considers it ambiguous, it may employ canons
of statutory construction to interpret the ambiguous law and may ultimately
interpret the law in the defendant's favor absent any ability for clear
interpretation. 41 This final step, resolving ambiguity in the defendant's

37 See United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174, 179-80 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing

varying circuits' decisions on interpretation of drug trafficking statute). The Fifth Circuit ruled
that the drug trafficking law presumed intent to distribute based on the quantity of drugs involved
in the trafficking, while the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits ruled that intent must be proven and
not implied. Id.
38 See infra Part III (investigating circuit split effects).
39 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (introducing core reasoning for this Note:
rectifying unfairness to defendants caused by overcriminalization).
40 See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964) (warning against retroactive
judicial expansion). A court must interpret a law before deciding whether to apply it to a
particular defendant, but the court must take care that it does not broaden the statutory meaning
beyond its language. See id.; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive
Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 455, 467-68 (2001)
(discussing retroactive judicial expansion). A court must guard against broadening a statute's
scope beyond the limit of its language, but when it does, it should be treated as an ex post facto
law. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353; Morrison, supra, at 467. Retroactive judicial expansion
effectively applies a statute against a defendant that did not apply when the action now amounting
to a crime commenced. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353; Morrison, supra, at 468. Butsee Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (concluding no retroactive application where Court's
current interpretation is what law always meant). The federal criminal law in question in Bousley
concerned the meaning of "use" in a firearms law: "Use" was thought to have meant mere
possession, but the Court determined in a subsequent case that "use" meant "active employment."
See id. at 616. In Bousley, the defendant was merely carrying the weapon but was charged under
the statute and pleaded guilty because he thought that the law meant mere possession. See id.
The Court, however, did not allow a habeas petition simply because the law meant something
different from what the defendant thought it meant. See id. at 622.
41 See United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 260-65 (2d Cir. 2000) (mapping statutory
construction). The Second Circuit in Dauray first examined the plain meaning of the statutory
language, then considered the statute's structure and consistency with the overall statutory
scheme, and finally examined its legislative history. See id. After the court employed these
methods of statutory construction, it found the statute ambiguous and applied lenity. See id.
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favor, constitutes application of lenity. 42 Lenity "promotes fairness in that
it helps avoid overcriminalizing allegedly criminal conduct," meaning that
Congress must "plainly and unmistakably" make some act a crime. 43

Further, applying lenity protects against abuses of power.
Various courts have applied lenity after they found a statute
ambiguous. 45 The guiding factor in determining whether to apply lenity is
the statute's measure of ambiguity. 46 Some courts apply lenity more
leniently, and others more strictly. 4 7 In whatever way a court applies

lenity, it works to belie the oppressive effect of the burgeoning federal
criminal law.48
Lenity does protect against abuses of power in this mushrooming

mass of law, but courts have lessened its application in recent years.49
42

See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (defining rule of lenity); cf Hester,

supra note 4, at 514-18 (explaining benefits and purpose of lenity).
43 See Bass, 404 U.S. at 347-48 (dictating Congress must unequivocally make a certain act
a
crime before defendants are properly charged); Abate & Mancuso, supra note 6, at 335
(describing how application of lenity can promote fairness); see also Moskal v. United States, 498
U.S. 103, 107 (1990) ("[Courts] must . . .determine what scope Congress intended [for the
allegedly ambiguous law].").
44 See Hester, supra note 4, at 514 (arguing lenity guards against "unfettered prosecutorial
discretion").
45 See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion) (applying
lenity where law's "commands are uncertain ...[and] punishment ...is not clearly prescribed");
Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (applying lenity when Court could not discern Congress's meaning);
Dauray, 215 F.3d at 264-65 (applying lenity when court could merely "guess as to [law's] proper
meaning").
46 See Afloskal, 498 U.S. at 107 (recognizing "touchstone" of lenity) (internal quotation
omitted); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) ("The touchstone of [the] principal [of
lenity] is statutory ambiguity."); Bass, 404 U.S. at 347-48 (recognizing two policies underlying
principle reasons for lenity). The Bass Court augmented its lenity analysis by describing the
rule's policy rationales, namely that potential defendants should have fair warning of the law's
language and meaning, and that courts should leave the determination of a law's meaning to the
legislature, thereby preventing the application of a law in a harsher manner than was intended. Id.
"Thus, where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the
defendant." Id.
47 Compare Santos, 553 U.S. at 514 (plurality opinion) (adopting more "defendant-friendly"
interpretation of ambiguous law), Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (emphasizing fair warning and cautioning
against judicial interpretations of ambiguous criminal laws), and Dauray, 215 F.3d at 264
(emphasizing fair warning and cautioning against mere judicial guessing at legislative meaning),
with Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (defining requirement necessary
for application of lenity as "grievous ambiguity") (internal quotation omitted), United States v.
R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 306 n.6 (1992) (refusing to require "narrowest" construction of ambiguous
law and allowing conviction after applying lenity), Afoskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (constructing
"ambiguous" to mean something more than mere possibility of another interpretation), and
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984) (declining to apply lenity where law is not
sufficiently ambiguous).
48 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (providing benefits to application of
lenity).
49 See Hester, supra note 4, at 514 (detailing courts' scaling back of application of lenity and
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Some courts refuse to apply lenity despite its favor in scholarly legal
analysis.50 This is largely due to the focus on applying other canons of
statutory construction-examination of the ambiguous statute's language,
structure, and legislative history-before applying lenity."
But when
courts apply lenity, they balance the scale of justice that would otherwise
tip defendants skyward, as beset by the mass of federal criminal law. 52
Another method courts use to determine the statutory meaning that
can affect the defendant is to analyze how other courts from around the
country, world, and throughout history, interpret and understand a statutory
term.53 From this analysis, courts can discern that particular word or
phrase's common-law meaning.5 4 When a federal criminal statute contains
a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, a

cautioning against it).
50 See id. at 522 ("Although the rule of lenity maintains a good deal of support in the
analytical literature . . . it is disfavored in contemporary jurisprudence."); see also Abate &
Mancuso, supra note 6, at 335 (promoting application of lenity); see, e.g., Af/uscarello, 524 U.S.
at 138-39 (rejecting application of lenity where ambiguity requirement was not met); Af/oskal, 498
U.S. at 108 (refusing to apply lenity where "ambiguous" means something more than possibility
of alternative interpretation); Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 484 (declining to apply lenity where law is not
sufficiently ambiguous); cf Recent Cases, Criminal Law Statutory Interpretation Ninth
CircuitHolds that 18 US. C. § 924(C)(I)(A)Defines a Single Firearm Offense United States v.
Arreola, 446 F3d 926 (9th Cir.), Superseded on denial of Reh'g and Reh'g en banc, 467 F3d
1153 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3002, 121 HARV. L. REV. 668, 675 (2007)
(advocating lenity should be applied more generically for flexibility in future cases). But cf Joel
M. Cohen et. al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243,
1266 (2008) (admonishing application of lenity without first exhausting other canons of statutory
construction). Some scholars believe that lenity should not narrow a law to favor the defendant
merely because a narrower interpretation of a law is possible. See id. This scholarly analysis
echoes the concern of the Afoskal Court. See Afoskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (finding a mere possible
alternate interpretation does not create statutory ambiguity sufficient to apply lenity).
51 See Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (providing lenity analysis only after applying other canons of
statutory construction); Cohen et. al., supra note 50, at 1266 (outlining canons of statutory
construction to apply before resorting to rule of lenity); Andrew C. Mac Nally, Comment, A
FunctionalistApproach to the Defintion of "Cocaine Base" in § 841, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,
740-41 (2007) (advising lenity application after other statutory construction canons to resolve
split over "crack cocaine" definition); cf Daniel Brenner, Note, The Firearm Owners' Protection
Act and the Restoration of Felons' Right to Possess Firearms: Congressional Intent versus
Notice, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2008) ("Some scholars ... believe that courts should
consider lenity throughout the interpretive process to resolve textual ambiguities .... ).
52 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (providing benefits to application of lenity).
53 See United States v. Bayes, 210 F.3d 64, 68 (1st Cir. 2000) (examining common law for
guidance on statutory interpretation); United States v. Merklinger, 16 F.3d 670, 673 (6th Cir.
1994) (exhuming common-law meaning by looking for common definition).
54 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) ("[W]here Congress borrows
terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts . . . the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless
otherwise instructed.").
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court will give the term its common-law meaning.55 Even this seemingly
neutral method of statutory interpretation can profoundly affect a
defendant.16 In this method of statutory interpretation, courts apply laws
against defendants after first interpreting its meaning by examining court
decisions both in and out of its jurisdiction.5 7 When courts search for a
common-law meaning, they may look to other circuits for interpretive
guidance on how to construe a particular law.58
Federal circuit courts do not need to follow the decisions of other
federal circuits, but are required to follow decisions within its circuit and
the United States Supreme Court.59 Circuit courts do, however, look to
60
other courts' decisions to benefit their reasoning in the case before it.
Therefore, federal court decisions-even those without precedential
effect-can influence statutory interpretation in other federal courts. 6'
Circuit splits can affect the Supreme Court's case load; the Court
often cites resolving a circuit split as a reason for granting certiorari of a
case. 62 The Court further understands that circuit splits can leave a law
55 See id.; see also United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 802 (10th Cir. 1999) (following
traditional definition of "assault"); Aferklinger, 16 F.3d at 673 (adopting traditional English
definition of "false making" to define "forgery"); United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 984 (3d
Cir. 1993) (recognizing common law meaning of "attempt"). In addition to case law, a court may
also look to law dictionaries, statutes, and scholarly commentaries to determine a word or
phrase's meaning. See Aferklinger, 16 F.3d at 673.
56 See Aferklinger, 16 F.3d at 673 (construing statute in favor of defendant based on
common-law meaning of "falsely makes"). The Aferklinger court found that "forgery" was
synonymous with "false making" as defined in English common law and has been so interpreted
"for centuries." Id. Further, the court acknowledged that American federal courts have followed
the English common law definition of forgery. Id. At English common law, forgery did not
include a genuine document with false contents, but was defined as a false document, or a
document "falsely made," even where every statement made therein was true in fact. Id. The
court used this common law meaning of the word and refused to apply a fraud statute, which
required the government to prove the element of forgery, against the defendant who made a
genuine document with false contents. Id.
57 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (providing common-law meaning analysis).
58 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (providing common-law meaning analysis).
59 See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 491 (2009) (presenting
precedential hierarchy in federal court system).
60 See Nicholas Melillo, Recent Case, People v. Lacey, 21 TOURO L. REV. 223, 226 (2005)
(noting federal circuit courts can look to other circuits' interpretations of law). Deciding courts
may cite to other circuit court decisions particularly in cases of first impression. See id.
61 See id. (determining courts examine other courts to help interpret laws, even those not
within same jurisdiction); see also cases cited supra notes 55-56 (exemplifying courts'
examinations of other courts' decisions that do not have precedential effect).
62 See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) ("We ...granted certiorari
to resolve a split among the [c]ircuits .... ) (citations omitted); Moskal v. United States, 498
U.S. 103, 106 (1990) ("[W]e granted certiorari to resolve a divergence of opinion among the
Courts of Appeals."); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1984) ("We granted
certiorari to resolve this conflict [among the circuits].").
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without sufficient certainty as required for fair warning. 6 The Court
permits a federal court of appeals to recognize other circuits'
interpretations of a law when determining whether the defendant had fair
warning, applying the statute against the defendant only if the defendant
had fair warning.64 Federal courts of appeals can take into account circuit
splits when deciding whether certain principles or rules are satisfied. 65 The
66
Court can instead note a circuit split without attributing any affect to it.
The Court may also note a circuit split and explicitly state that it did not
67
affect its ruling.
A circuit split has varying effects on federal courts of appeals as

63

See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997) ("[D]isparate decisions in various

Circuits might leave [a federal criminal] law insufficiently certain ...[and] such a circumstance
may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough ....). The Court
noted that fair warning corresponds to statutory ambiguity in that an ambiguous statute does not
provide fair warning. See id.; see also cases cited supra note 46 (discussing fair-warning
requirement and its correlation to application of lenity). The Lanier Court, however, would not
create a "categorical rule that [such] decisions ... are inadequate as a matter of law to [find fair
warning]." Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269.
64 See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269 (allowing federal courts to take into account other circuits'
decisions to analyze fair-warning requirement).
65 See id.; see also United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App'x 135, 142 (11th Cir. 2008) (taking
into account circuit split when determining no plain error in lower court's statutory
interpretation); United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (1 lth Cir. 2005) (finding no plain
error where circuits are split on proper statutory interpretation). Plain error review requires a
defendant to "show there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights,"
when arguing that the lower court incorrectly interpreted a criminal statute. Id. at 1019 (citing
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). When other circuits are split on the issue and
when the Supreme Court and the deciding circuit have not ruled on it, the deciding court takes the
circuit split into account the fact of the split itself lessens the plainness, the obviousness, of that
error. Id. But see Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 625 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting circuit split had "no great[] legal significance"). In Bousley,
Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have allowed the habeas petition sought by the
defendant because the defendant "received critically incorrect legal advice" as to the meaning of
the statute: The trial judge, defense counsel, and the prosecutor interpreted the term "use" in the
statute to mean mere possession, but the Court later interpreted the term "use" within the statute
to mean "active employment." Id. at 626. Justice Stevens determined the "constitutionally
invalid" application of the law, though constitutionally invalid after the fact, was "severe" and
"unfair" enough to allow a habeas petition. Id. Though Justice Stevens gave the circuit split little
legal significance, the law was undeniably ambiguous because the defendant simply did not know
what the law truly meant. Id. at 625-26.
66 See Aloskal, 498 U.S. at 115 (discerning meaning of term from various courts'
interpretations). The Tenth Circuit did not determine washed titles to be "falsely made," but the
Third Circuit did. Id. at 115 n.7. The Supreme Court granted certiorari from this split, but also
looked at the lower courts' reasoning and others' to determine that no overriding common-law
meaning of "falsely made" existed, so Congress could not have meant to extract meaning from
the common law. Id. at 115 n.7, 116.
67 See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (refusing to apply lenity even where
circuits were split on statute's interpretation); see also Cohen et. al., supra note 50, at 1266 ("[A]
split among the courts about the meaning of a statute is not enough to trigger lenity.").
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well. 68 A federal court of appeals may cite to a split, merely noting it,
while agreeing with one interpretation and not another.69 Alternatively, a
court of appeals may merely mention the circuit split, though it ultimately
holds no significance to its ruling. 70 Making the split even less significant,
a court may present evidence of a circuit split without mentioning it as

such. 7'

Conversely, a court may note the lack of a circuit split on a

statute's interpretation and provide as the reasoning for its ruling, at least in
part, the refusal to create a circuit split. 72 A court may attempt to prevent a
split in interpretation to increase its own decision's credibility or, perhaps73
artificially, prevent ambiguity from impinging the statute's applicability.
Circuit splits create ambiguity and uncertainty, especially for "officers,
prosecutors, defendants, and courts., 74 A federal court of appeals should
recognize a circuit split on a federal criminal law's interpretation and use it,
along with canons of statutory construction, to determine whether to

construe the statute against or in favor of the defendant.
68 See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (detailing potential treatment of circuit splits
by circuit courts).
69 See United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2008) (agreeing with Sixth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and disagreeing with Eleventh Circuit). The Lopez-Salas court found
that the quantity of drugs possessed did not amount to a drug trafficking offense in the meaning
of the federal guidelines. Id. Along with its stated agreement of the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits' interpretations and its disagreement with the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation, the court
additionally cited to its own circuit's precedent in reaching its holding. Id.
70 See United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 261 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting various
interpretations of "other matter"). The Dauray court applied the rule of lenity, but the circuit split
was merely incidental and not the deciding factor in the court's application of lenity. Id. at 264.
71 See United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425, 427 n.2 (3d Cir. 2003) (referring to circuit split
by citing solely contradictory holdings among circuits).
72 See United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Nor do we think it
prudent to create a circuit split on this important statutory issue that Congress views as having
nationwide implications.").
73 See Wendy Biddle, Note, Let's Make a Deal. Liability for "Use of a Firearm" When
Trading Drugsfor Guns Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(C), 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 65, 103-04 (2003) ("[A]
plausible alternative reading . . . suggest[s] that . . . the statutory language . . . [is] not . . .
precisely defined .... "). But see United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984) (refusing to
apply lenity where circuit split gave defendant notice); Cohen et. al., supra note 50, at 1266
(claiming circuit splits do not imbue ambiguity).
74 See Christopher Lieb Nybo, Comment, Dialing M for Murder: Assessing the Interstate
Commerce Requirement for Federal Murder-for-Hire,2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 579, 584 (2001)
(noting disagreement on interpretation creates uncertainty); cf Morrison, supra note 40, at 513-20
(noting critical opinions of inconsistency caused by circuit splits). If "[f]ederal courts addressing
the [requirements of a statute] have clearly disagreed over how to resolve the issue" of the
statute's interpretation, then "law enforcement officers, prosecutors, defendants, and courts
[would] remain uncertain as to whether [the statute applies] ." Nybo, supra, at 584.
75 See In re S. Star Foods, Inc., 144 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1998) (evidencing federal
statute's ambiguity through recognition of circuit split on its interpretation). "The split in the
circuits is, in itself, evidence of the ambiguity" of the statutory language. Id. Note that the statute
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IV. EFFECT OF CIRCUIT SPLITS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW:
EVIDENCING AMBIGUITY
A. Tempering FederalOvercriminalization
The build-up of federal criminal law is excessive and
inappropriate.76 This excess requires some counter, lest the government
become too invasive with the growing number of unfair applications of
federal criminal law.77 A defendant is subject to double punishment for the
same act without double jeopardy protections. 7 Federal criminal law's
expanded scope increases the likelihood that a defendant will be doublecharged. 79 Due to this overlap of federal law over state law, states' rights
have been smothered. 0 Federal criminal law even overlaps itself, allowing
federal prosecutors to punish a defendant for a broad array of crimes."'
These laws are often ambiguous, and this ambiguity allows federal
prosecutors to broaden the law's scope and charge crimes normally charged
in state court 8 2
In applying federal criminal law against defendants, prosecutors
are first to interpret a statute.8 3 Ironically, prosecutors are the first line of
defense for a defendant: They can interpret the statute narrowly to favor a
defendant, or broadly, thereby increasing the likelihood that a defendant's
action would be encompassed by the law, and thus that a defendant would

in In re Southern Star Foods is a bankruptcy law, not a criminal law. Id. at 713. The method the
Tenth Circuit used to decipher the statute's meaning and application, however, is similar to the
statutory construction analysis a court uses to determine the meaning of a criminal statute. See id.
at 715-16 (analyzing legislative history when statutory language proves ambiguous).
76 See supra notes 1-3, 24-28 and accompanying text (criticizing excess of and explaining
detriments caused by expanded federal criminal law).
77 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (determining need for relief from pervasive
federal criminal law).
78 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (detailing dual sovereign doctrine); see also
Fusco, supra note 2, at 283 (explaining lack of double jeopardy protections in dual sovereign
doctrine).
79 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (decrying potential for increased
prosecutions through combination of dual sovereignty and increased federal criminal law). "The
increase in the scope of federal criminal law ... has greatly expanded the likelihood of successive
prosecutions." United States v. Angleton, 221 F. Supp. 2d 696, 712 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
8o See supra notes 27-29 (criticizing anti-federalism effect of increased federal criminal law).
81 See supra notes 4, 28 and accompanying text (discussing increase in prosecutorial power
due to increase in federal criminal law).
82 See supra notes 4, 25-26, 28 and accompanying text (discussing increase in prosecutorial
power due to ambiguity in federal criminal law).
83 See Hester, supra note 4, at 514 (noting prosecutors are first to interpret criminal statutes).
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be convicted.8 4 Prosecutors, like courts, should use canons of statutory
construction to ultimately favor a defendant if the statute is ambiguous."'
Prosecutors may not, for whatever
reason, choose to use canons of statutory
86
construction, but courts must.
After courts employ canons of statutory construction, and if the law
is still ambiguous as to its meaning and possible applications, the court
should construe the statute more favorably toward the defendant. 8 7 The
policy decisions behind lenity consist of the fair notice doctrine and the
notion that courts should not make law, especially criminal law because
liberty is at stake, but should merely interpret the statute's language as
written by the legislature.8 8 If a court finds a statute ambiguous, it should
not try to construe the statute against a defendant, but rather favor a
defendant in its application, if it can be applied at all. 89 Lenity, then, helps
provide a fair outcome when a court determines a particular criminal statute
is ambiguous. 90
See id. (predicting potential for prosecutorial abuse from prosecutors' ability to interpret

84

laws).
85

See id. (proposing prosecutorial use of lenity, particularly when courts in same jurisdiction

do not use it); see also supra notes 41, 51 (providing various methods of statutory construction
and their various uses).
86 See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 512 (2008) (plurality opinion) (suggesting
benefit from applying lenity).
This venerable rule [of lenity] not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no
citizen should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are
uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also places the
weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly
and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead.
Id. The Court in Santos explicitly adopted the more defendant-friendly interpretation of the
statute in question. See id at 518-19; see also note 51 and accompanying text (providing canons
of statutory construction ending in lenity application).
87 See supra notes 42-44, 46 and accompanying text (detailing uses and rationale of lenity).
88 See supra notes 43 and 45 (stating courts should merely interpret law and apply lenity
when statute is ambiguous); supra note 46 (interpreting fair warning as backbone of lenity,
requiring fair notification of statute's meaning before application).
89 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of lenity).
Courts
should carefully apply statutes against defendants by refusing to broaden the statute's scope
without specific congressional direction. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353
(1964).
"[J]udicial decisions can indeed change the practical meaning of statutory law."
Morrison, supra note 40, at 467.
90 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (arguing fairness of lenity). The fairness of
lenity arises under the distinction between general versus specific intent standards: Without
straightforward direction from the statute's language, a court should apply lenity to the
ambiguous mental state requirement and apply a specific intent standard. See Abate & Mancuso,
supra note 6, at 335. A specific intent standard requires a higher degree of knowledge before
violation, namely that the defendant must have knowingly violated the statute, versus the general
intent standard where the defendant must merely have knowledge of their acts that ultimately
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Courts have cut away at the applicability of lenity, which has
unfortunately been concurrent with the overcriminalizing of federal law. 9'
Courts that do still apply lenity do so most often as a last resort.92 Before
applying lenity, courts apply definitive methods of statutory construction
when they find statutes ambiguous. 93 But when a court interprets a statute,
if it finds that a criminal law remains ambiguous after using the traditional
methods of construction, it should construe the statute more favorably
toward the defendant. 94 In whatever way a court chooses to do it, a court
should construe an ambiguous statute in the defendant's favor to promote
fairness and constitutional integrity. 9
B. Courts Should Look to Other Courts
Federal circuits sometimes split on the interpretation of criminal
law. These courts may look to other courts to determine the common-law
meaning of a statutory term, which may cause a defendant-favorable
96

violated the ambiguous statute. See id. ("In the context of [the statute], interpretation of the term
'knowingly violates' has created a conflict between application of the specific and general intent
standards."). Assuming a statute is ambiguous, lenity requires application of a specific intent
standard when the statute does not provide clear direction. See id. ("[L]enity must be applied and
the 'less severe interpretation' would prevail; specifically, that interpretation which endorses the
specific intent standard for knowing violation cases.").
91 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (cautioning against scale back in use of lenity);
see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (reproving recent build -up of federal criminal law).
"Because the meaning of language is inherently contextual, we have declined to deem a statute
'ambiguous' for purposes of lenity merely because it was possible to articulate a construction
more narrow than that urged by the Government." Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108
(1990) (citation omitted). "The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity ... is not sufficient
to warrant application of [lenity], for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree .... To invoke
the rule, we must conclude that there is a "'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty' in the statute."
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1998) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991))).
92 See United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 262-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (outlining methods
of
statutory construction ending with consideration of lenity).
93 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing statutory construction analysis as
sufficient without applying lenity to resolve statutory ambiguity).
94 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (making case for applying lenity); see also
Mac Nally, supra note 51, at 740-41 (exemplifying how lenity can resolve circuit split "tension"
caused by varying definitions of "crack cocaine").
95 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (detailing federal court's responsibility to
merely interpret congressional language); cases cited supra note 46 (providing case law
exemplifying fairness of lenity); supra note 29 (lofting federalism as protection against
infringement of liberty); see also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 512 (2008) (plurality
opinion) ("[L]enity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants
subjected to them.").
96 See supra Part II (discussing circuit splits in federal criminal law).
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interpretation.9 7 Circuit courts may also look to other circuit courts to help
their analyses of interpretation even while also recognizing a circuit split in
its interpretation. 98 For example, a circuit court may take a split into
account when determining whether a defendant had fair warning. 99 In
those circumstances, circuit splits can leave the statute's meaning
"insufficiently certain."' 00
A circuit court may apply a statute against a defendant despite a
circuit split on its interpretation.'10 Similarly, a court may not find plain

error as to a court's interpretation of a statute simply because various courts
reach divergent conclusions as to its meaning. 102 This argument essentially

97 See supra notes 54, 56 and accompanying text (describing method by which courts

exhume common-law meanings and construe them in practice).
98 See supra notes 69-75 (discussing courts' varying treatment of circuit splits); see also
Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 116-17 (1990) (examining vague statutory language and
varying interpretations among circuits). The Aloskal Court noted that courts sometimes give
varying interpretations to a statute's term, but refuse to give effect to one merely because it was
the most common interpretation:
Where . . . no fixed
appropriate to inquire
the overall purposes
Congress adopted the
courts.

usage [of a word] exist[s] at common law, we think it more
which of the common-law readings of the term best accords with
of the statute rather than to simply assume, for example, that
reading that was followed by the largest number of common-law

Id.
99 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997) (interpreting statute leniently where

a circuit split gave no clear indication of meaning).
Although the Sixth Circuit was concerned, and rightly so, that disparate decisions in
various Circuits might leave the law insufficiently certain even on a point widely

considered, such a circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the
warning is fair enough, without any need for a categorical rule that decisions of the

Courts of Appeals and other courts are inadequate as a matter of law to provide it.
Id.

100 Id.

101See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App'x 135, 142-43 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting circuit

split on statutory interpretation but applying law against defendant despite split). "[W]hen neither
the Supreme Court nor [we have] resolved an issue, and other circuits are split on it, there can be
no plain error in regard to that issue." Id. at 142 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
The Lesure court actually used the circuit split against the defendant-though the circuits were

split as to an issue of interpretation, the court did not allow the defendant to cite plain error as a
defense. Id.
102 See United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005) (detailing
court's
review of plain error). The defendant bears the burden under plain error review, and when the

circuits are split on the issue of interpretation, the split itself does not necessarily lend credence to
the statute's ambiguous nature. Id. The court determined that if another court interprets the
statute a certain way, the deciding court's interpretation cannot be plainly erroneous simply
because other courts have also interpreted it that way. Id.
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follows from the fact that separate federal circuit courts interpret legislative
language and that more than one interpretation may exist. 103 Alternatively,
a circuit court may create a split, but instead of creating
ambiguity, the
04
circuit's disparate interpretation could simply be wrong. 1
However dissimilar another circuit's interpretation, a court should
not ignore "plausible alternative readings"-for which the ultimate
evidence consists of a circuit split-when determining the meaning of a
particular criminal statute. 105 This would be contrary to the fair notice
doctrine, which lenity enhances, thus putting a defendant on notice, not of a
statute's ambiguity, but of the possibility of prosecution. 106 This effect of a
circuit split causes inequity against which lenity seeks to protect, and courts
should not construe a law against a defendant because of a circuit split. 107
Courts should account for circuit splits by using them as evidence of
ambiguity, and should account for ambiguity by construing the statute
favorably for the defendant. 10"
C. CircuitSplits in FederalCriminalLaw: Evidence ofAmbiguity
Circuit splits can profoundly affect a court's interpretation of
federal criminal law. 109 Circuit splits can affect the Supreme Court by
103

See sources cited supra note 65 (discussing lack of importance given circuit splits in plain

error analysis); see also Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019 (circuit splits do not affect plain error
analysis).
104 See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 56 (2000) (expanding upon circuit split of
statute's interpretation). "The rule of lenity does not alter the analysis. Absent ambiguity, the
rule of lenity is not applicable to guide statutory interpretation." Id. at 59 (citation omitted). The
Johnson Court would not find statutory ambiguity as evidenced by a circuit split, but rather found
that one side of the split incorrectly interpreted the statute. See id. ("The Court of Appeals was
mistaken... [because] the text of [the statute] cannot accommodate the rule the Court of Appeals
derived.").
105 See Biddle, supra note 73, at 103-04 (arguing circuit splits create
ambiguity).
106 See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984) ("[A]ny argument by respondent
against retroactive application . ..even if he could establish reliance upon [an] earlier . .
•decision, would be unavailing since the existence of conflicting cases from other Courts of
Appeals made review of that issue by this Court and decision against the position of the
respondent reasonably foreseeable."). The Court in Rodgers determined that the circuit split on
the statute in question gave the defendant notice that the Eighth Circuit's interpretation could be
wrong. See id.But see supra note 74 and accompanying text (arguing multiple interpretations of
law create uncertainty as to its meaning); cf supra note 47 and accompanying text (reasoning
defendant should have fair warning of law before courts apply it).
107 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of applying lenity).
108 See Biddle, supra note 73, at 103-04 (suggesting "plausible alternative reading" of statute
provides evidence of imprecise congressional purpose and statutory language). A "plausible
alternative reading" can be evidenced by a circuit split on the interpretation of the statute's
language and is therefore evidence of statutory ambiguity. See id.
109 See supra notes 69-75 (discussing courts' varying treatment of circuit splits).
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providing a reason to take certiorari, or can simply exist without much
consequential treatment by the Court."10 Circuit splits can affect the federal
circuit courts when they choose to acknowledge a split, ignore it, or even
refuse to cause one."' But more than simply affecting courts in various
ways, circuit splits can significantly affect individual criminal defendants
causes a court to pause before construing a statute against a
when the split
2
defendant."1
Criminal defendants comprise the group most intimately affected
by law, and are rightly a special and highly protected litigant class." 3 The
federal government forces criminal defendants into court to defend their
liberty and prejudices them through the charge itself, but must prove their
guilt before they can be convicted."14 Yet the federal government's burden
has improperly lessened because the amount of criminal statutes has
burgeoned."5 This dangerous inverse relationship affronts ideals inherent
within the American system of government while subjecting criminal
defendants to greater jeopardy. 116 Worse still, many statutes' correct
interpretations and meanings are insufficiently certain, which allows further

110See supra notes 62, 66-67 and accompanying text (providing varying effects of circuit
splits on the Supreme Court).
III See supra notes 65, 69-73, and accompanying text (describing varying effects of circuit
splits on federal circuit courts).
112 See supra notes 65, 74 (noting specific effects of circuit splits on defendants despite
proposition that splits are inconsequential); cf Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 625-26
(1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (warning effects on prior defendants
when Court resolves splits). A circuit split resolution harms past defendants on the losing side of
the split, that is, those courts whose interpretation of the criminal law in question has been
overturned in favor of another interpretation. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 625-26 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens noted that a Supreme Court ruling on a
particular federal criminal law essentially creates a retroactive application of what the law meant
since it took effect. See id. If the defendant against whom the law was applied was instead tried
under the new Supreme Court interpretation, the law would not have been applied against that
defendant. See id. This discrepancy is unfair. See id.
113 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (setting forth vulnerability of
defendants and reasons to apply lenity); see also Clymer, supra note 5, at 647 (describing litany
of defendant-faced tribulations).
114 See supra note 113 and accompanying text (highlighting defendants' vulnerability).
Criminal penalties are serious and "usually represent[] the moral condemnation of the
community." Bass, 404 U.S. at 348.
115 See sources cited supra notes 20, 24-26 (detailing growth of federal criminal laws
and
consequently expanded prosecutorial power).
116 See supra notes 29, 113 and accompanying text (providing vulnerability of defendants
when protections of federalism lessen); supra text accompanying note 27 (criticizing decreased
federalism where federal criminal laws' tread on states' criminal laws); see also sources cited
supra note 5 (exemplifying extreme disparity between federal and state criminal law for same
acts).
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ability to convict defendants in federal court. "1
But American jurisprudence adapted a remedy to the evils spawned
from politics: Courts will not apply an ambiguous statute against a
defendant."8 Evidence of ambiguity via a circuit split does not necessarily
have to be a canon of statutory construction, but rather, could lead to it. " 9
Circuit splits provide prima facie evidence of ambiguity, and a court, in
fairness, should consider the circuit split
when deciding whether to apply a
20
1
defendant.
a
against
statute
criminal
V. CONCLUSION

Courts, the last defenders of liberty, can dispel harmful effects of
ambiguous laws. The mere legal reality that different circuit courts
interpret a law in disparate ways is perhaps the best evidence of a law's
ambiguity. Courts must responsibly interpret laws, not make them, and
thus must not construe an ambiguous statute against a defendant. Courts
should use the evidence of ambiguity inherent within circuit splits to
determine whether to apply federal criminal statutes against defendants.
Julian W. Smith

117 See

supra notes 4, 25 and accompanying text (discussing increase of prosecutorial power

resulting from broad interpretations of ambiguous laws).
118 See sources cited supra notes 43-44 (discussing benefits of lenity); supra note 21 and
accompanying text (reasoning federal criminal law expanded due to politics); see also supra notes
22-33 and accompanying text (attending need to dispel federalized criminal law regardless of
cause because of its negative effects).
119 See supra note 75 (recognizing circuit splits in statutory interpretation can lead to use of
statutory construction analysis); supra notes 41, 51 and accompanying text (describing use of
canons of statutory construction, sometimes ending in application of lenity); see also Brenner,
supra note 51, at 1066 (discussing advantage of applying lenity throughout statutory
construction). But see Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) ("[The Court never]
deemed a division of judicial authority automatically sufficient to trigger lenity."). The Afoskal
Court was concerned that "one court's unduly narrow reading of a criminal statute would become
binding on all other courts." Id. A circuit split should not necessarily be binding authority, but it
should be a practical consideration, that is, a legal reality that a defendant should be permitted to
present to a deciding court to help it reach its legal conclusion on the interpretation of a federal
criminal law. See supra notes 73-75 (presenting circuit split as evidence of ambiguity to question
whether to construe statute against defendant).
120 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("[L]egislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity."); supra note 113 and accompanying text (outlining criminal
defendants' vulnerability); supra notes 43-44, 46, 74-75 and accompanying text (advocating
fairness of lenity); supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (noting "plausible alternative
reading" is evidence of ambiguity); supra notes 74, 105 and accompanying text (presenting
circuit splits as evidence of alternative interpretations).

